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Abstract
Private equity ﬁrms are an important part of the industrial restructuring process. We
argue that the key is temporary ownership. Buying to sell induces aggressive restructuring
since the equilibrium trade sale price increases both because the proﬁts of the acquiring
incumbent increase and the proﬁts of non-acquiring incumbents decrease. Therefore, pri-
vate equity backed ﬁrms are more leveraged and have managers with more ownership as
compared to incumbents. By being outsiders, private equity ﬁrms specialize in restructur-
ing to outbid incumbents with incentives to preemptively acquire targets. Welfare effects
of buyouts are ambiguous, but consumers gain from a buyout.
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11 Introduction
Private equity ﬁrms are an important part of the industrial restructuring process that is taking
place in all industries across the world. Davis et al. (2009) show that around 2% of US non-
farm employees worked in a private equity backed ﬁrm in 2005 and that productivity on average
grows by about two percentages points more at private equity backed ﬁrms than at comparable
ﬁrms in the manufacturing industry during two years after the transaction. Bloom et. al (2008)
present evidence that private equity backed ﬁrms excel in people and operations management
practices; skills that are important when restructuring activities are undertaken.
This raises the question of why private equity ﬁrms are so active at restructuring. We argue
that the key is that private equity funds are set up to acquire and resell assets. The median
holding period of a company in a private equity fund is around six years, with a trade sale to an
incumbent as the most common exit route (occurring in 38% of all cases according to Kaplan
and Str¨ omberg, 2009). We show that exits though trade sales gives incentives for aggressive
restructuring since the equilibrium trade sale price increases both because the proﬁts of the
acquiring incumbent increase and the proﬁts of non-acquiring incumbents decrease. Moreover,
by being initial outsiders to the industry, private equity ﬁrms have incentives to specialize in
restructuring to outbid incumbents with incentives to preemptively acquire targets.
To make our argument, we develop a model where several symmetric incumbents compete
in an oligopoly. One ﬁrm, the target, has assets in need of restructuring, but cannot restructure
itself as it lacks resources or knowledge. The target’s assets are sold to one of the incumbents,
or to one of several competing private equity ﬁrms through a ﬁrst-price perfect information
auction. Post acquisition, the new owner hires a manager to restructure the assets, giving her
a linear compensation contract consisting of a ﬁxed wage and a share of the product market
proﬁts. Restructuring raises the product market proﬁts of the eventual acquirer of the assets,
but reduces the product market proﬁts for its rivals. If a buyout takes place, the private equity
ﬁrm then exits its investment through a trade sale to one of the incumbents (again through a
ﬁrst-price perfect information auction). Finally, all incumbents compete in the product market;
one of them is in possession of the restructured assets.
In this setting, the equilibrium trade sale price consists of an incumbent’s product market
proﬁts from owning the assets in relation to the proﬁts arising if a rival incumbent obtains
them. Private equity ﬁrms buying to sell (maximizing a trade sale price) thus have incentives
to overinvest in restructuring compared to incumbents that buy to keep (maximizing product
market proﬁts). The trade sale price responds more to restructuring, since it both increases
the product market proﬁts of the incumbent acquiring the restructured assets (a ”carrot effect”)
and decreases the product market proﬁts of its rivals (a ”stick effect”). Buying to sell thus
gives incentives to ”overinvest” in restructuring, as private equity ﬁrms account for the effects
of restructuring on rivals in the industry. Given that ownership in the ﬁrm and debt induces
a manager to work harder at restructuring, ”overinvestment” is consistent with the empirical
2ﬁndings that private equity backed ﬁrms are more productive (Amess 2002, 2003; Harris et al.
2005, Davis et al. 2009), have managers with more intense compensation contracts (Kaplan,
1989a; Leslie and Oyer, 2008), and are more leveraged (Axelson et al., 2009).
But stronger incentives to restructure the target do not mean that private equity ﬁrms can
outbid incumbents in the initial acquisition auction. Incumbents have incentives to preemp-
tively acquire the target to prevent a buyout and the subsequent sale of an intensively restruc-
tured and competitive target back to the industry. We identify several reasons for why private
equity buyouts take place in equilibrium despite the incumbent’s incentives to preemptively
acquire the target.
First, by being outsiders in the industry they have incentives to build up unique restructur-
ing skills. Since private equity ﬁrms do not have industry speciﬁc assets that the incumbents
have–and since incumbents will outbid the private equity ﬁrms if they are equally efﬁcient at
restructuring–private equity ﬁrms will have stronger incentives than incumbents to invest in
acquiring restructuring skills. If they succeed, they are able to outbid incumbents.
Second, private equity ﬁrms may have exogenous cost advantages arising from preferential
tax treatment or from easier access to capital due to long term relationships with banks and
institutional investors. Such advantages could allow them to outbid incumbents.
Third, non-acquiring incumbents gain more from a direct preemptive acquisition than the
acquiring incumbent. Thus, a coordination failure can emerge between incumbents and a pri-
vate equity ﬁrm can outbid the incumbents with a positive probability.
Our paper contributes to three strands of literature. By studying acquisition, restructur-
ing, and resale of assets in an oligopoly, we introduce private equity ﬁrms to the literature on
industrial organization. The literature on mergers and acquisition tends to treat owner asymme-
tries, and pre- and post-merger investments, in a cursory way. An exception is Gowrisankaran
(1999), who uses numerical methods to study the evolution of an industry allowing for entry,
exit and investments as well as mergers. A large set of papers (Salant et al. 1983; Perry and
Porter, 1985; Deneckere and Davidson, 1985; Farrell and Shapiro, 1990; Gilbert and Newbery,
1992) clarify how mergers affect prices, proﬁts and welfare, depending on the market structure
in various static oligopoly models. Such papers are sometimes referred to as the exogenous
merger literature since the ﬁrms that merge are exogenously chosen. They do not touch on
the terms of the deal and leave aside the strategic concerns we focus on. Recently, a literature
on endogenous mergers has emerged in which the central question is who merges with whom
(Kamien and Zang, 1990; Horn and Persson, 2001; Fridolfsson and Stennek, 2005). We add
to this trend by showing that the presence of private equity ﬁrms specializing in buying to sell
affects the merger and restructuring pattern in an industry. We identify an important role of
the private equity ﬁrms as challengers of existing oligopolies through aggressive restructuring
of ﬁrms up for sale. The welfare effects of buyouts are ambiguous, but consumers always
gain from a buyout as opposed to an acquisition as a private equity backed ﬁrm will be more
restructured (and hence more productive) compared to a ﬁrm bought by an incumbent.
3Our paper also relates to the ﬁnance literature on private equity buyouts. This literature
has proposed that private equity ﬁrms are specialists at solving managerial agency problems,
mainly through closer monitoring, extensive use of debt and giving the manager ownership
in the ﬁrm (Jensen, 1986; 1989). By concentrating ownership, they are assumed solve free-
rider problems related to dispersed ownership (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling,
1979) and therefore have stronger incentives to improve governance. Yet, this approach fails to
explain why boards of public companies do not implement the same measures as private equity
backed ﬁrms (higher leverage and a closer connection between pay and performance) to induce
more restructuring effort. We argue that this divergence can partly come from private equity
ﬁrms buying with the intent of selling, whereas incumbents buy with the intent of keeping.
Indeed, if agency problems are present, high managerial ownership or high leverage is required
for private equity ﬁrms to induce more intense restructuring compared to incumbents. The
fundamentaldifferenceinincentivestoraisemanagerialownershiporleveragecomes, however,
from buying to sell versus buying to keep. Further, as we work with strategic product market
effects it brings our paper into the literature on the interaction between ﬁnancial markets and
product markets (Brander and Lewis 1986, 1988; Maksimovic, 1988; Bolton and Scharfstein,
1990; Williams, 1995; Phillips, 1995; Chevalier, 1995a,b; and Miao, 2005). We contribute
by showing that buying to sell affects compensation contracts and ﬁnancial structure, which in
turn affects investment behavior and product market performance.
Finally, our paper is a contribution to the literature on endogenous ownership and efﬁciency
dating back to Coase (1960). He argued that in a zero-transaction world, laissez-faire always
leads to optimal outcomes irrespective of assignment of property rights. Departing from the
zero transaction cost assumption, Gans (2005), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore
(1990), among others, show that ownership structure has implications for efﬁciency in an in-
complete contract framework. Jeheil and Moldovanu (1999) show that the outcome of a resale
marketisnotefﬁcientinaframeworkwithexternalitieswhencommitmentstofutureactionsare
not possible. We contribute by examining the outcome allowing for investments in the assets
up for resale, which enables us to show that even if the assets end up in the hands of the most
efﬁcient owner, the equilibrium investment in the assets is not the efﬁcient one. Owners buying
assets for resale have incentives to overinvest in relation to the eventual acquirer’s ﬁrst best
because of externalities in the resale auction (in accordance with Jehiel et al. 1999; Jehiel and
Moldovanu, 1999, 2000). Moreover, we show that different owners face difference incentives
to specialize in taking care of the assets such that ownership need to vary over time to achieve
dynamic efﬁciency. The overinvestment effect is present also in Katz and Shapiro (1996) and
Norb¨ ack and Persson (2009), but in their settings owners cannot endogenously decide whether
to sell or keep the assets or to specialize in different skills.
We have structured the paper in the following way. In section 2 we present the model
and show that private equity ﬁrms buying to sell have incentives to induce more restructuring
compared to incumbents buying to keep. To achieve this they give managers more ownership
4in the ﬁrm (and take on more debt). In section 3, we then ask when buyouts will occur in
equilibrium. We demonstrate that incumbents have incentives to preemptively outbid private
equity ﬁrms to prevent intense restructuring of the assets. But buyouts still occur if private
equity ﬁrms have successfully acquired superior restructuring skills, if private equity ﬁrms
have an exogenous cost advantage, or if incumbents fail to coordinate bidding. We discuss
robustness and extensions to the model in section 4, and mention empirical implications in
section 5. We end with concluding remarks in section 6.
2 Buying to sell, compensation contracts, and restructuring
We begin by presenting our four stage model and solving the last three stages to illustrate the
main mechanism: buying to sell leads to more intense compensation contracts for managers
and more intense restructuring efforts compared to buying to keep. The model is based on the
following observed industry characteristics:
 The product market is oligopolistic. Many buyouts take place in either mature concen-
tratedindustriesorgrowingindustriesinwhichtargetspossessstrategicassets. Forexam-
ple, KovenockandPhillips(1995)ﬁndevidencethatlowproductiveﬁrmsinconcentrated
markets are more likely to face a buyout.
 Assets are acquired and sold through competitive auctions. As Boone and Mulherin
(2007) show, the U.S. takeover market was competitive during the 1990s; the majority of
all acquisitions took place after multiple bids had been submitted.
 Private equity ﬁrms are committed to sell the ﬁrms they acquire through their funds, since
the funds they set up have limited time horizons after which they must be closed and the
capital returned to investors.
 Exit takes place through a trade sale. Kaplan and Str¨ omberg (2009) report that condi-
tional on having exited, 38% of all exits are trade sales and only 14% are IPOs. We focus
on trade sales as they are most common and discuss IPOs in section 4.
 Post-acquisition, the new owner implements governance, ﬁnancial and operational im-
provements to restructure the target (Jensen 1986,1989; Kaplan and Str¨ omberg 2009).
The new owners in our model decide on incentive contracts for the managers, and man-
agers then decide on restructuring intensity. We also develop a version of the model in
section 4 in which debt replaces managerial ownership as a way of inducing managerial
effort.
Formally, consider an oligopoly industry served by a set I = f1;2;::;i;:::;ng of symmet-
ric incumbents, each possessing the basic assets necessary for production. The industry also
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Figure 1: This ﬁgure illustrates and describes the four stage game we analyze: the initial acqui-
sition auction, the restructuring and compensation stage, the exit auction, and oligopoly market
interaction between incumbent ﬁrms.
contains a ﬁrm called the target. The target’s assets are in need of restructuring, but the tar-
get cannot undertake the process by itself because of lack of cash or knowledge. The game is
illustrated in Figure 1 and proceeds as follows.
In stage one, an acquisition of the target by incumbent i or by the private equity ﬁrm j 2
J = f1;2;::;j;::;mg takes place at the acquisition price S1 determined in a ﬁrst-price perfect
information auction with externalities. Externalities mean that the value of winning for a bidder
is determined relative to what happens if the bidder loses the auction (Jehiel and Moldovanu
(1999), Jehiel et al. (1999), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000)). The new owner type (l) is either an
incumbent buying to keep (l = k) or a private equity ﬁrm buying to sell (l = s).
In stage two, the new owner hires a manager to restructure the assets. Because of moral
hazard and risk aversion, the new owner must provide incentives for the manager to exert effort
6and offers the manager a share l of the product market proﬁts. The manager then determines
the amount of restructuring, r(l), to be undertaken.
In stage three, if the target was bought by a private equity ﬁrm, a trade sale of the target to
one of the incumbents takes place. The trade sale price, S3, is determined through a ﬁrst price
perfect information auction with externalities.
In stage four, incumbents compete in the product market by setting price or quantity (xi),
given how much the assets were restructured (r(l )) and who is in possession of the assets
(z 2 I). Incentive problems are restricted to the restructuring stage, and do not appear in the
product market interaction stage.
2.1 Stage four: product market interaction
Using backward induction, we start in stage four with product market competition between the
n incumbents. One of them owns the restructured target. Since product market competition
takes place post-exit, private equity ﬁrms do not own assets in this stage and hence do not
produce.
Each incumbent i chooses an action 2 R+ to maximize the direct product market proﬁt
i(xi;x i;r;z). The proﬁt depends on its own actions xi; its rivals’ actions x i (an (N 1)1
vector); how much the target has been restructured (r); and the identity of the incumbent in
possession of the target (z). We assume a unique Nash-Equilibrium in actions, x(r;z), exists







 i;r;z) = 0; 8i: (1)
Using the ex-ante symmetry among incumbents, we can drop z and distinguish between
two ﬁrm types: the acquiring incumbent (A) and the non-acquiring incumbents (NA). Since
the optimal action for the acquirer (x
A) and actions for the non-acquirers (x
NA) only depend
on the level of restructuring r, we can deﬁne the reduced-form product market proﬁts of the























Restructuring increases the proﬁts of the acquirer, but reduces the proﬁts for non-acquiring
incumbents as they must compete with a better rival.
Assumption 1
dRA
dr > 0 and
dRNA
dr < 0:
This assumption is compatible with several oligopoly models. One example is the linear
Cournot model:
7Example 1 (The LC-model) The oligopoly interaction is Cournot competition with homoge-
nous goods. The product market proﬁt is j = (Pj   cj)qj where ﬁrms face inverse demand
P = a   Q, where a > 0 is a demand parameter and Q = N
j=1qj is aggregate output. In the
LC-model, ownership of the invention reduces the marginal cost. Making a distinction between
ﬁrm types, we have:





s = 0forh = fA;NAg,which
can be solved for optimal quantities q = (q
h;q
 h), where q
h is the output of a ﬁrm of type h
and q
 h the output of its competitors. Noting that
@h
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In the LC-model, it is easy to see that
dRA
dr > 0 and
dRNA
dr < 0. But Assumption 1 is also
compatible with many other oligopoly models with other competitive modes, cost and demand
structures such as Bertrand models with differentiated products and multi-plant models as long
as restructuring either affects the variable production cost or the quality of the product sold
by the incumbent in possession of the restructured assets. For example Assumption 1 will be
fulﬁlled for many parameters values in the following differentiated product multi-plant model
(DMP-model):
Example 2 (The DMP-model) Let each ﬁrm initially own and produce one product. Let the
inverse demand of a product be Pj = a qj  q j, in which  2 [0;1] is the degree of product
substitutability ( = 0 implies a monopoly and  = 1 implies homogenous goods), qj is the
output of product j and q j is the output of the other products. The product market proﬁt for a
ﬁrm with product j is j = (Pj   cj)qj. Dividing up in ﬁrm types, assume that marginal costs
are:
cA = c    k; cN = c    k; cT = c   r: (5)
where cT is the marginal cost of the target ﬁrm and  k represents ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets. Note
that the acquirer will own two products (its own product and the target ﬁrm’s product). The
Nash-Cournot equilibrium q = (q
h;q
 h) is then determined from the ﬁrst-order conditions
@(A+T)
@qT = 0 and
@(A+T)
@qA = 0 for the acquirer, and
@N
@qN = 0 for a non-acquirer. We can
then deﬁne RA = [PA(q)   cA]q
A + [PT(q)   cT]q
T as the associated reduced-form proﬁt
function for the acquirer and RN = [PN(q)   cN]q
N as the reduced proﬁt function for a non-
acquirer. The DMP-model can also be solved for Bertrand competition. The inverse demand
function in Pj = a   qj   q j is inverted into direct demand, qj(p;), with p = (pj;p j).
Dividing into ﬁrm types, the direct proﬁt is h = (ph   ch)qh(p). Let p = (p
h;p
 h) be
the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium from the ﬁrst-order conditions
@(A+T)
@pT = 0 and
@(A+T)
@pA =
0 for the acquirer, and
@N
@pN = 0 for a non-acquirer. From these conditions we can deﬁne
8RA = [p
A   cA]qA(p) + [p
T   cT)]qT(p) and RN = [p
N   cN]qN(p) as the associated
reduced-form proﬁt functions.
It can be shown that in the DMP-model, regardless if there is Bertrand or Cournot com-
petition, Assumption 1 holds as long target ﬁrm has sufﬁciently low variable costs relative to
incumbents before restructuring take place. From (5), this implies that  k cannot be too large
relative to r. Intuitively, if an incumbent has a very efﬁcient production of its own product
an increase in restructuring r of the target ﬁrm’s product will cannibalize on proﬁtable sales
in its original plant, and thereby reduce aggregate proﬁts (implying that
dRA
dr < 0). However,
Assumption 1 holding for all parameter values is only a sufﬁcient condition for our analysis.
It could be that Assumption 1 holds for some values of r which is all that is needed for our
analysis.
2.2 Stage three: the exit auction
If a buyout takes place in stage one, the private equity ﬁrm exits its investment through a ﬁrst
price perfect information auction with externalities. The n incumbents simultaneously post
bids, which are accepted or rejected by the private equity ﬁrm. Each incumbent announces a
bid, bi, with b = (b1;:::;bi;:::bn) 2 Rn being the vector of these bids. Following the announce-
ment of b, the restructured target is sold to the incumbent with the highest bid. If more than
one ﬁrm makes an offer of the highest value, each such incumbent obtains the target with equal
probability.
The exit auction is solved for Nash equilibria in undominated pure strategies. There is a
smallest amount, ", chosen such that all inequalities are preserved if " is added or subtracted.
An incumbent’s maximum willingness to pay for the target is
!kk = RA(r)   RNA(r): (6)
The ﬁrst term shows the proﬁt for the incumbent if it obtains the target. The second term shows
the proﬁt of the same incumbent if it does not obtain the target and is forced to compete with
a rival that obtained the target. Denote the trade sale price in stage three by S3(r). Lemma 1
follows.
Lemma 1 The equilibrium trade sale price is S3(r) = RA(r)   RNA(r).
Proof. See the appendix.
This lemma follows since the incumbents are ex-ante symmetric and hence, their valuations
are symmetric and they will all post the same bid equal to their maximum valuation of obtaining
the restructured assets from the private equity ﬁrm.
92.3 Stage two: managerial ownership and restructuring
In stage two, the new owner hires a manager to restructure the assets. Because of moral hazard,
the owners give the manager a share of product market proﬁts in addition to a ﬁxed wage.
Uncertain restructuring costs in combination with CARA preferences for the manager make it
costly for the owners to give the manager a share of the proﬁts. This cost must be balanced
with the incentive effects of higher managerial ownership.
The restructuring costs for the ﬁrm, net of managerial compensation, are uncertain and
given by F   ", with "  N(0;2). The personal effort cost of restructuring for the manager
is C(r), with C0(r) > 0 and C00(r) > 0: the more restructuring, the harder the decisions the
manager must make. The manager is risk averse and has CARA preferences,
u(w;r) =  e
 [w(b;;r) C(r)]; (7)
in which  measures the degree of risk aversion.
The restructuring effort undertaken by the manager is observed but not veriﬁable and cannot
be contracted on. The manager is therefore offered a linear contract fb;g consisting of a ﬁxed
wage b and a share  2 [0;1] of the product market proﬁts net of restructuring costs:
w = b + [RA(r)   F + "]: (8)
In what follows, we ﬁrst solve for the restructuring decision of the manager given the com-
pensation contract, and then turn to the optimal contract to offer the manager.
2.3.1 Restructuring effort by the manager
Consider the manager’s decision on how much restructuring (r) to undertake given contract




This expression follows from equation (7) and (8). We can separate out the stochastic term ",
and since "  N(0;2) it follows that E[e "] = e 22 2
2 . Deﬁning 
() = 2 2
2 as the






[b + [RA(r)   F]   C(r)   
()]: (10)









dr being the marginal increase in the manager’s compensation and C0 the marginal
increase in her effort cost.








A   C00 > 0: (12)
Here we have used the short notation R0
A = dRA=dr and R00
A = d2RA=dr2, and assumed that
the second-order condition R00
A   C00 < 0 is satisﬁed. We depict optimal restructuring effort
by the manager in Figure 2(i) as the upward-sloping locus r().
From equation (11), it is also convenient deﬁne reduced-form expressions for the proﬁt
functions of the incumbents Rh()  Rh(r()) for h = fA;NAg; the compensation contract
to the manager w(b;)  b + [RA(r())   F + "]; and for the effort cost of the manager,
C()  C(r()).
2.3.2 The contract offered by an incumbent
Suppose now that a buy-to-keep incumbent has obtained the target in stage one. The incumbent
will maximize expected proﬁts E[RA(k) F+" w(bk;k)] by choosingthe contract fbk;kg
optimally. Assuming perfect competition between managers, the optimal contract must fulﬁll
the participation constraint w(bk;k)   C(k)   
(k) =  w, with  w being the outside option
for the managers. Solving w(bk;k) =  w + C(k) + 
(k) from the participation constraint,
using E["] = 0, the expected proﬁt for the incumbent can be written as
E[RA(k)   F + "   w(bk;k)] = RA(k)    (k); (13)
in which  (k) = F +  w + C(k) + 
(k) is the total costs of restructuring (the sum of the
expected ﬁxed restructuring cost and the compensation paid to the manager).
Itfollowsfromequation(13)thattheoptimalsharetogivetothemanageris
k = argmaxk[RA(k) 









The optimal share 
k is shown point K in Figure 2(ii). The marginal revenue from giving a




d , consisting of the marginal increase in restructuring from
an increased share (dr
d > 0) and the marginal effect of restructuring on proﬁts (
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dr > 0). The
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0() > 0). In other

















































































Figure 2: Illustrating the solution to stage one and two. Part (i) depicts the optimal restructuring
effort by the manager as the upward-sloping locus r(). Part (ii) shows how buying to sell
gives a higher marginal revenue curve compared to buying to keep and leads to a stronger
incentive contract for the manager. Part (iii) illustrates how the maximum valuations in stage
one are determined. Incumbents have incentives to outbid private equity ﬁrms.
12from increased restructuring effort, but the cost is that the manager now demands a higher wage
both because exerting effort is costly and because the manager must take on more restructuring
risk.
The optimal share of ownership to give the manager balances these effects. An incum-
bent buying to keep will thus offer the manager a contract consisting of the share 
k given
from equation (14) combined with the ﬁxed wage b






k) =  w.
2.3.3 The contract offered by a private equity ﬁrm
Suppose instead that a private equity ﬁrm obtained the target in stage one. A private equity
ﬁrm will maximize the expected trade sale price net of total restructuring costs. Recall that
from Lemma 1, the trade sale price is S3(s) = RA(s)   RNA(s). Solving the manager’s
compensation w(b;s) =  w +C(s)+
(s) from her participation constraint and noting that
E["] = 0, it follows that the expected proﬁt for a private equity ﬁrm can be written as
E[S
3(s)   F + "   w(b;s)] = RA(s)   RNA(s)    (s); (15)
in which total restructuring costs are  (s) = F +  w + C(s) + 
(s).
From equation (15), it follows that the optimal share to give to the manager is 
s =














The optimal equity share 
s is given from point S in Figure 2(ii). The marginal revenue







d , reﬂecting the effect of a higher
share on restructuring (dr











0 > 0, reﬂecting both the effect from increased personal effort costs
for the manager and an increase in the risk premium. In other words, the beneﬁt of giving the
manager more ownership in the ﬁrm backed by a private equity ﬁrm is an increase in the trade
sale price from increased restructuring effort. The trade sale price rises in restructuring both
because it increases the proﬁts of the acquiring incumbent and because it decreases proﬁts for
non-acquiring incumbents. And again, the cost is that the manager now demands a higher wage
because exerting effort is costly and because the manager must take on more restructuring risk.
Thus, in a private equity backed ﬁrm, the manager will be given a contract consisting of
the share 
s given from equation (16) combined with the ﬁxed wage b






s) =  w.
132.4 Why buying to sell leads to powerful incentive contracts and intense
restructuring
Let us now compare the incentive contract given to the manager by a private equity ﬁrm with a
contract given to the manager by an incumbent.







The proof of Proposition 1 follows directly from the ﬁrst order conditions in equations (14)
and (16). To see this, have a quick look at Figure 2(ii). The marginal cost of increasing the
manager’s share,  0, reﬂects higher wage demands from higher effort cost of restructuring and
for taking on higher risk. From equation (8), an incumbent buying to keep and a private equity
ﬁrm buying to sell share this same marginal cost. However, the marginal revenue of increasing
the share  is not the same: an incumbent buying to keep accounts for how restructuring in-




d > 0), while a private equity ﬁrm buying
to sell accounts for how restructuring increases the trade sale price. The trade sale price in-










Comparing equations (14) and (16), the effect on non-acquiring incumbents causes a private
equity ﬁrm buying to sell to give the manager a stronger incentive contract (
s > 
k) than an
incumbent buying to keep. In Figure 2(ii) this shown by the location of point S to the right of
point K. Since managers in private equity backed ﬁrms have stronger incentive contracts, it
follows directly from (12) that they do more restructuring compared to managers working for
incumbents (r(
s) > r(
k), illustrated in Figure 2(i)).
3 The equilibrium emergence of private equity ﬁrms
The next step is to move back to stage one of the model and study the initial acquisition auc-
tion. The bidders are private equity ﬁrms buying to sell and incumbents buying to keep. The
question we ask is when private equity ﬁrms buying to sell are able to outbid incumbents buy-
ing to keep. In oligopolistic markets, letting a private equity ﬁrm acquire the assets means
that incumbents will either end up with a rival with more competitive assets, or bid intensively
against other incumbents for the restructured assets in a later stage. As such, incumbents have
incentives to preemptively outbid private equity ﬁrms in order to prevent overinvestment (from
their perspective) in restructuring the assets. We identify three reasons why private equity buy-
outs take place in equilibrium: a coordination failure can emerge between incumbents, private
equity ﬁrms can have exogenous cost advantages compared to incumbents, and private equity
ﬁrms have incentives to invest in acquiring specialized restructuring skills.
143.1 Stage one: the acquisition auction
As in stage three, the acquisition auction in stage one is a ﬁrst price perfect information auction
with externalities. Again, we solve for Nash equilibria in undominated pure strategies. The
n incumbents and the m private equity ﬁrms simultaneously post bids, which are accepted
or rejected by the target. Each incumbent and private equity ﬁrm announces a bid, bi, with
b = (b1;:::;bi;:::bn+m) 2 Rn+m is the vector of these bids. Following the announcement of b,
the target is sold to the incumbent or the private equity ﬁrm with the highest bid. If more than
one ﬁrm makes an offer of the highest value, each such bidder obtains the target with equal
probability.
Since the auction has externalities, the maximum valuations are determined as proﬁts from
winning the auction in relation to proﬁts from losing it. Remembering that E["] = 0, we work
without the expectations operator and deﬁne the valuations vs, vkk and vks as follows.
 vs is the valuation of obtaining the target for a private equity ﬁrm buying to sell. To derive
vs, evaluate the expected proﬁt for a private equity ﬁrm in equation (15) at the level of













 vkk is an incumbent’s valuation of obtaining the target if another incumbent would oth-
erwise have obtained it. Evaluating the expected proﬁt of an incumbent in equation (13)
















 vks is an incumbent’s valuation of obtaining the target if a private equity ﬁrm would
otherwise have obtained it, restructured it, and sold it back to the industry. Thus, eval-
uating the expected proﬁt of an incumbent in equation (13) at the optimal share 
k and
















These valuations can be ranked in six ways and the auction solved by considering each
ranking in turn.
Lemma 2 The equilibrium ownership of the target and the acquisition price S1 in stage one is
given in Table I.
15Inequality Deﬁnition Winning type Acquisition price, S1
I1 vkk > vks > vs k vkk
I2 vkk > vs > vks k or s vkk;vs
I3 vks > vkk > vs k vkk
I4 vks > vs > vkk k vs
I5 vs > vkk > vks s vs
I6 vs > vks > vkk s vs
Table I: This table describes the equilibrium ownership type (k or s) and the acquisition price
S1 for each possible ranking of the valuations v.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma2givestheequilibriumownershipstructureforanyrankingofthevaluations. Given
equations (17), (18) and (19), we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Private equity ﬁrms cannot outbid incumbents in the initial acquisition auction.
The target is acquired by an incumbent at the acquisition price S1 = vs:
The reasoning behind Proposition 2 is the following. The valuations can be uniquely ranked
as vks > vs > vkk, making inequality I4 in Lemma 2 the relevant one. Since multiple private
equity ﬁrms bid for the target, the acquisition price S1 is at least vs. A private equity ﬁrm
must also have a higher maximum valuation than an incumbent preempting a rival acquisition:
vs > vkk. This follows directly since when setting the compensation contract, a private equity





3()    ()] = argmax
 [RA()   RNA()    ()]: (20)
Hence, it must be that vs = RA(
s) RNA(
s)  (







s maximizes vs. This is illustrated in Figure 2(iii), in which vs > vkk.
Figure 2(iii) also reveals that an incumbent has an incentive to preempt private equity ﬁrms:
vks > vs. This is true since









is always larger than zero since 
k = argmax[RA()    ()] and 
s > 
k.
Intuitively, since a private equity ﬁrm buying to sell induces more restructuring (r
s > r
k),
incumbents realize that if they let a private equity ﬁrm acquire the assets, they will face a more
competitive ﬁrm in the industry once restructuring is done and the target is sold back to the
industry. Even if they end up acquiring the assets in the exit auction, they will be no better off
(they net RNA(
s) in both cases). Thus, they realize that the value of preventing a buyout (vks)
is higher than the value of preventing a rival incumbent from obtaining the assets (vkk) and thus
one of them outbids the private equity ﬁrms.
163.2 Buyouts in equilibrium
Let us now discuss three reasons for why private equity buyouts take place in equilibrium: pri-
vate equity ﬁrms have incentives to invest in acquiring specialized restructuring skills, private
equity ﬁrms can have exogenous cost advantages compared to incumbents, and a coordination
failure can emerge between incumbents.
3.2.1 Specialization in restructuring
Private equity ﬁrms are fundamentally outsiders in the industry: they do not own any assets
in the market prior to bidding for the target’s assets. Since private equity ﬁrms do not have
industry speciﬁc assets that the incumbents have–and since incumbents will outbid the private
equity ﬁrms if they are equally efﬁcient at restructuring–private equity ﬁrms will have stronger
incentives than incumbents to invest in acquiring restructuring skills. If they succeed, they are
able to outbid incumbents. More speciﬁcally, in this section, we show that if private equity
ﬁrms and incumbents can choose to invest in acquiring specialized restructuring skills prior
to bidding for the target’s assets in stage one, there exists an asymmetric equilibrium in which
privateequityﬁrmsspecializeatrestructuringandoutbidincumbentswithapositiveprobability
in the acquisition auction in stage one.
To show this we add a stage zero to the game in which agents can invest in restructuring
skills. To simplify, we assume that there are ﬁve agents in the market: the target (t), two
potential incumbent acquirers (k1 and k2) and two private equity ﬁrms (s1 and s2). The two
incumbent ﬁrms and the two private equity ﬁrms choose simultaneously in stage zero whether
to retain the ﬁxed restructuring cost F, or to invest in acquiring specialized restructuring skills
at cost 	. Investing in acquiring restructuring skills sets the ﬁxed restructuring costs to zero
with probability 1/2 and to F with probability 1/2. The expected restructuring costs are thus
~ F = 1
2F. The draws of ~ F become common knowledge in the end of period zero.
We will now show that an asymmetric Nash-equilibrium exists in which private equity ﬁrms
(without prior assets in the market) invest in acquiring specialized restructuring skills while
incumbents choose not to acquire these skills. Buyouts then occur in equilibrium if at least one
of the private equity ﬁrms gets a good draw and thus lowers the restructuring cost from F to
zero.
Consider ﬁrst the private equity ﬁrms. Formally, let (Fs1;Fs2;Fk1;Fk2) = ( ~ F; ~ F;F;F) be
the equilibrium candidate. First, consider deviation by a private equity ﬁrm. Let s( ~ Fj ~ F;F;F)
be the expected proﬁt for a private equity ﬁrm of investing in restructuring when the other
private equity ﬁrm also invests, but no incumbent invests. Since incumbents have an incentive
to preempt private equity ﬁrms at symmetric restructuring costs, vks > vs, the expected proﬁt
from not investing is zero s(Fj ~ F;F;F) = 0 . Thus, a private equity ﬁrm will not deviate
from investing if
s( ~ Fj) =
1
4
F   	 > 0 = s(Fj) (22)
17in which a private equity ﬁrm alone is successful in acquiring the restructuring skills with
probability 1/4 and F is the net gain (vs   S1) from obtaining the target at a price S1 =
vs  F (the valuation of the other unsuccessful private equity ﬁrm is vs  F, so this will be the
equilibrium buyout price). The bars above the valuations denote valuations absent restructuring
costs F. From equation (22), if the restructuring costs are sufﬁciently large F > 4	 a private
equity ﬁrm will stick with investing in acquiring specialized restructuring skills ( ~ F).
Now consider the incumbents. Let k(Fj ~ F; ~ F;F) be the expected proﬁt for an incumbent
ﬁrm of choosing not to invest (F) when the private equity ﬁrms choose to invest ( ~ F), but the
rival incumbent does not invest. Let also s( ~ Fj ~ F; ~ F;F) be the expected proﬁt from deviating
























Expected proﬁt under incumbent acquisition
; (23)
in which the probability that at least on private equity ﬁrm succeeds is 3/4, and the probability
that none of the private equity ﬁrms succeeds is 1/4. In the latter case, there will be an in-
cumbent acquisition at price vs   F and an incumbent becomes the acquirer with probability
1/2.
Now turn to the proﬁt for an incumbent if it chooses to invest in acquiring specialized
restructuring skills. If it does, it fails to learn anything new with probability 1/2 and succeeds
with probability 1/2. In the latter case, the incumbent will buy the target at the price S1 = 3
4vs+
1
4(vs F) = vs  F
4, since with probability 3/4 at least one private equity ﬁrms succeeds and the
incumbent pays this ﬁrm’s valuation vs: Since an incumbent fails to obtain a low restructuring
cost with probability 1/2 and succeeds with probability 1/2, the expected proﬁt from investing
is



















Expected proﬁt under acquisition
]   	: (24)
From equation (23) and equation (24), we can now examine when incumbents choose not
to invest. With some manipulation we can derive the following condition
k(Fj)   k( ~ Fj) =
1
16
[vs   vkk | {z }
(+)
  7(vks   vs)
| {z }
(+)
  2F] + 	 > 0 (25)









= ( ~ F; ~ F;F;F); in which private equity ﬁrms invest in
acquiring restructuring skills while the incumbents choose not to invest:
F > 4	; and
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Figure 3: Illustrating the assymetric equilibrium in which only private equity ﬁrms that do not
already have assets in the market invest in acquiring specialized restructuring skills.
The upper line gives the condition for a private equity ﬁrm to choose ~ F, while the lower line
gives the condition for incumbents to choose F. In the lower line,  = vs   vkk   7(vks   vs)
is likely to be negative because incumbents have incentives to preempt private equity ﬁrms.
Figure 3 illustrates the condition in equation (26) in the 	   F space using the linear
quadratic Cournot model to calculate . As can be seen, in order to have private equity ﬁrms
choose to invest in acquiring restructuring skills, the costs F must high relative in relation to the
investment cost 	. This occurs above the locus F = 4	. Intuitively, a higher restructuring cost
F causes a higher reward to succeeding since the acquisition price paid by the private equity
ﬁrm S1 = vs  F decrease in F. However, ﬁxed restructuring costs cannot be too high since it
will then proﬁtable for incumbents to choose to invest in acquiring restructuring skills as well.
An incumbent ﬁrm choosing to invest would pay the expected price S1 = vs   F=4; which is
also decreasing in the restructuring cost F.
Hence, an asymmetric equilibrium exists in which private equity ﬁrms invest in acquiring
skills to restructure ﬁrms, while incumbents choose not to make this investment.
Proposition 3 If private equity ﬁrms and incumbents can choose to invest in acquiring spe-
cialized restructuring skills prior to bidding for the target’s assets in stage one, there exists
an asymmetric equilibrium in which private equity ﬁrms specialize at restructuring and outbid
incumbents with a positive probability in the acquisition auction in stage one.
It is tedious, yet simple, to show that if agents were allowed to endogenously select whether
to enter the market and acquire assets (become an incumbent) or stay out of the market (and
become private equity ﬁrms), the asymmetric equilibrium we identify above would still be
present. In the example with two incumbents and two private equity ﬁrms, F > 4	 would be
a necessary condition for private equity ﬁrms to emerge in equilibrium.
19In a more extended setting, private equity ﬁrms could repeatedly make use of their restruc-
turing skills. Private equity ﬁrms then have incentives to exit their investments and look for
new restructuring opportunities once they are ﬁnished with the assets they currently hold. As
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) note: ”Exit strategies are important because LBO special-
ists’ unique expertise lies in their ability to oversee the efﬁcient restructuring of operations.
Once such restructuring is largely accomplished in a given ﬁrm, the LBO specialist’s marginal
productivity will be higher if it redeploys capital and efforts elsewhere.”
3.2.2 Exogenous cost advantages
Compared to incumbents, private equity ﬁrms may have cost advantages giving them the ability
to acquire assets in equilibrium. Since they are repeat players in the debt markets and raise
money from institutional investors, they have easier access to capital. This lowers their costs
of ﬁnancing both the deal and restructuring the assets compared to incumbents, who are more
likely to be ﬁnancially constrained.
Private equity ﬁrms are often also claimed to face preferential tax treatment because of their
legal status as partnerships, and because of interest rate deductibility laws that allows private
equity backed ﬁrms to beneﬁt from a tax shield of debt. Badertscher et al. (2009) empirically
document that majority owned private equity backed ﬁrms face substantially lower marginal
tax rates as a result of the tax shield of debt. Kaplan (1989b) has also shown empirically that
interest deductibility beneﬁts equal 21% of the premium paid in buyout transactions, whereas
incremental depreciation tax beneﬁts from marking up assets to market value equals 28% of
the premium paid.
To capture this formally, assume that private equity ﬁrms face exogenously lower ﬁxed
operating costs associated with acquiring and running the ﬁrm, Gh, such that Gs < Gk. The
compensation given to the manager is then
wh = b + [RA(r)   F + "   Gh] h = s;k: (27)
Equation (21), determining if a buyout takes place, then becomes








s)]   [Gk   Gs]: (28)
This expression can be both positive and negative. If Gk Gs is sufﬁciently large, private equity
ﬁrms are able to outbid incumbents in equilibrium despite the preemptive motive incumbents
have.
If cost advantages arise in the variable costs of restructuring the ﬁrm, the analysis becomes
more intricate but the main results hold true. Suppose that in addition to the ﬁxed restructuring
costs F, the incumbents and the private equity ﬁrm face variable costs of fh(r), for h = s;k
with f0
s = dfs(r)=dr < f0
k = dfk(r)=dr and f00
s = d2fs(r)=dr2 < f00
k = d2fk(r)=dr2. Now it is
20no longer true that the effect of an increase in the managerial ownership share  is the same if
the assets are incumbent owned as it is when the assets are owned by a private equity ﬁrm. The
reason is that r











h()) h = s;k: (29)






d > 0. We delegate the details of this full analysis to the
Appendix, but we can show that exogenous variable cost advantages for private equity ﬁrms
will induce more high powered incentive contracts for managers in private equity backed ﬁrms,
which lead to more intense restructuring even when product market effects are absent. Product
market effects, however, amplify the differences in the intensity of the compensation contract
and restructuring.
In spite of this, variable cost advantages for private equity ﬁrms can cause buyouts to occur
in equilibrium. Equation (21) determining if a buyout takes place now becomes
^ vks   ^ vs = RA(r

k(^ k))    k(r

k(^ k); ^ k))   [RA(r

s(^ s)))    s(r

s(^ s); ^ s))]: (30)
Since ^ k = argmax[RA(r
k())    k(r
k();)], a preemptive acquisitions could occur
(^ vks   ^ vs > 0). However, the variable cost advantage of private equity ﬁrms makes total costs
lower for a given contract ( s() <  k()). If private equity ﬁrms do not give managers ”too
intense” contracts compared to incumbents, ^ vs   ^ vks > 0 can hold. This is illustrated in Figure
4, in which lower variable costs for private equity ﬁrms shift the solid lines to the dotted lines,
implying that ^ vs   ^ vks > 0.
3.2.3 Coordination failures
Coordination failures can be a reason for why buyouts take place in equilibrium. From the
discussionfollowingProposition2, itfollowsthatthegainsfromadirectpreemptiveacquisition
by an incumbent in stage one are unevenly distributed among incumbents. In particular, the
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Incumbents if buyout occurs.
(31)
This can cause a coordination failure between incumbents. Private equity ﬁrms can then
outbid the incumbents even though vks > vs. This can be shown by extending the auction
in stage one to mixed strategy equilibria. In a mixed strategy equilibrium, incumbents can
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Figure 4: This ﬁgure illustrates the valuations in stage one if variable costs of restructuring
differ between incumbents and private equity ﬁrms. Lower variable costs for private equity
ﬁrms shift the solid lines to the dotted lines, implying that ^ vs   ^ vks > 0 and that a buyout can
take place in equilibrium.
equity ﬁrms always bid their maximum valuation vs. There are two possible outcomes. In the
ﬁrst, at least one incumbent bid vs and a preemptive acquisition takes place. In the second, no
incumbents bid for the assets and a private equity ﬁrm obtains them at price vs. Consequently,
if incumbents fail to coordinate who should outbid the private equity ﬁrms, buyouts occur in
equilibrium.
3.3 Welfare effects of buyouts: the case of merger policy
Let us end this section on the equilibrium emergence of private equity ﬁrms with a note on the
welfareeffectsofbuyouts. Theconventionalwelfareevaluationinamergeranalysisistypically
made by comparing the sum of consumer surplus and proﬁts (including the sales price of the
target) in different market structures. We adhere to this approach and compare welfare under
an incumbent acquisition to welfare if a buyout takes place.
Consider a setting in which private equity ﬁrms face ﬁxed restructuring costs of ﬁxed costs
Fs and incumbents face ﬁxed costs Fk. To simplify, no manager needs to be hired; the owners
can directly set r at cost C(r). Consumer surplus, CS(r), increases in restructuring intensity:
CS0(r) > 0, and Ws is total welfare under a buyout and Wk is total welfare under an incumbent
acquisition.
If a buyout occurs, compared to an incumbent acquisition, the acquirer’s proﬁts and con-
22sumer surplus is larger, but non-acquirers’ proﬁts are smaller:

















































The total effect on welfare is ambiguous, but overinvestment (from the point of view of
incumbents) by private equity ﬁrms in restructuring is good for consumers. However, overin-
vestment hurts non-acquiring incumbents and also brings with it increased restructuring costs.
Moreover, allowing the initial market structure to be stable, i.e. the target ﬁrm to be sufﬁ-
ciently efﬁcient, it can be shown in an extended model that an active private equity market can
ignite the process of creative destruction by triggering mergers and restructuring in an initially
merger-stable industry. In fact, the mere threat of a private equity buyout can cause a pre-
emptive incumbent acquisition that takes place to prevent aggressive restructuring by a private
equity ﬁrm. Total welfare can increase or decrease. Restructuring increases productivity and
thereby raises the proﬁts of the possessor and consumers, but it reduces the proﬁts of rivals.
The industry also becomes more concentrated leading to an increase in incumbents’ proﬁts and
a decrease in consumer surplus. A private equity buyout compared to a direct incumbent acqui-
sition, however, unambiguously beneﬁts consumers but hurt incumbents; aggressive restructur-
ing by the private equity ﬁrm beneﬁts consumer through lower prices but hurts incumbents due
to a tougher bidding competition for the restructured assets. A discriminating merger policy
against private equity buyouts would thus be counterproductive, since most jurisdictions have
consumer welfare as the goal of the merger policy.
4 Extensions and Robustness
We have now set up our model and shown that private equity ﬁrms buying to sell have incen-
tives to induce more restructuring compared to incumbents buying to keep, and thereby give
managers more ownership in the ﬁrm. We have also demonstrated that incumbents have incen-
tives to preemptively outbid private equity ﬁrms to prevent intense restructuring of the assets.
Buyouts occur in equilibrium if incumbents fail to coordinate bidding, if private equity ﬁrms
have exogenous cost advantages, or if private equity ﬁrms have successfully acquired superior
restructuring skills.
Inthissection, wediscussrobustnessandofferasetofextensionstoourframework. Section
234.1 allows incumbents to buy assets in order to sell them. This extension does not signiﬁcantly
alter our results. Our results are also not affected if the manager’s incentive contract is based on
the trade sale price instead of on product market proﬁts (section 4.2). In section 4.3 we study
debt as an incentive mechanism, and show that high leverage in private equity backed ﬁrms can
be a consequence of buying to sell. In section 4.4 we brieﬂy study the choice between a trade
sale and an IPO, describing how not too convex restructuring costs and high IPO costs lead
private equity ﬁrms to favor a trade sale over an IPO. We end this section by discussing other
potential selling mechanisms for assets apart from a ﬁrst price perfect information auction.
4.1 Incumbents buying to sell
Our model assumes that incumbents buy assets to keep them, whereas private equity ﬁrms buy
assets to sell them. Would our results still hold if incumbents could imitate private equity ﬁrms
and also buy to sell?
Suppose that an incumbent acquired the target in stage one and that the incumbent attempts
to sell the restructured assets to a competitor. From Lemma 1, we know that the trade sale
price in stage three is S3 = RA()   RNA(). We also know the proﬁts from competing with
a rival who possesses the assets are RNA(). Thus, the total proﬁts from selling the assets and
remaining in the industry would be S3 + RNA(). Working through the contract for a hired
manager in stage two, the expected proﬁt an incumbent mimicking a private equity ﬁrms the
exactly the same as in equation (13):
E[S
3()   F + "   w(b;) + RNA()] = RA()    (): (33)
From equation (33) it is clear that an incumbent buying to sell gives the same optimal contract
as an incumbent buying to keep: f
k;b
kg. But then, propositions 1 and 2 still hold. The key to
why the incumbent does not become as aggressive as a private equity ﬁrm is that the incumbent
internalizes the effect on its other asset holdings when setting the compensation contract that
determines restructuring intensity.
But cannot the incumbent sell all of its assets and completely exit the industry? This is
possible, but if it is proﬁtable or not will depend on the classical merger proﬁtability condition
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An exit leads to a concentration of the market since there are only n 1 incumbents remaining
in the market.
In general, the sign of equation (34) depends on merger and market-speciﬁc characteristics
24such as level of concentration in the market and asset complementaries. For example, if the
asset complementaries are sufﬁciently low, and the market power increase caused by the merger
is sufﬁciently low, the incumbent will not have the incentives to completely exit the industry.
4.2 Incentive contracts based on the trade sale price
In the main analysis, we assumed that the manager was given a share of the product market
proﬁts (RA(r)) net restructuring costs. This enables us to compare the intensity of the compen-
sation contract for the two ownership types. It is also consistent with many contracts used in
practice as managers in private equity backed ﬁrms are often required to remain with the target
(or are forced to keep their stocks in the ﬁrm) post exit in order to reduce problems associated
with, for example, window dressing.
However, if the manager is allowed to sell all shares at the time of exit, the relevant share
for the manager is a share of the trade sale price instead of a share of the product market proﬁts.
Can this affect our results?
Suppose that in stage two the private equity ﬁrm gives the manager a contract f;bg in
which the equity share  now speciﬁes a share of the trade sale price S3(r) = RA(r) RNA(r)
net of restructuring costs. The wage compensation given to the manager is then
w = b + [RA(r)   RNA(r)   F + "]: (35)
Workingthroughthemanager’soptimizationproblem, weﬁndthatthemanager’sﬁrst-order














Under incumbent ownership, managerial compensation is still based on a share of the prod-
uct market proﬁt and the optimal restructuring by the manager is still given from equation (11).




s() > r(). This means that a manager in a private equity ﬁrm buying to sell will
undertake more restructuring than a manager in an incumbent ﬁrm buying to keep for a given
share . This is shown in Figure 5(i).
From equation (36) and (11), the manager in a private equity backed ﬁrm also reacts more
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Figure 5: This illustrates the solution for stage one and two of the game when the manager
is offered a share of the trade sale price instead of a share of product market proﬁts. The
manager then reacts stronger to increased managerial ownership, however it is still optimal for
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S  v ks  v s  0
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vs v ks v s
Figure 6: This illustrates the solution to Stage one when an incumbent offers the manager a
”relative compensation contract” that mimics the contract a private equity ﬁrm offers. Even
then, private equity ﬁrms use more intense compensation contracts and can not outbid incum-
bents.
more sensitive to an increase in the share is because of the effect on non-acquirers (R
0
NA =
dRNA=dr < 0) of increased restructuring.
Consider now the optimal share to give the manager. The optimal ownership share for the
incumbent remains unchanged at 
k = argmax[RA(r())    (r();)]. However, the

















When the manager receives a share of the trade sale price, two effects causes stronger
incentive contracts in private equity backed ﬁrms (~ s > 
k). Private equity ﬁrms buying to sell
have stronger incentives to induce restructuring since they maximize the trade sale price S3.
In addition, managers in private equity backed ﬁrms responds more vigorously to an increase
in the share  as shown in (37). This is illustrated in Figure 5(ii), in which ~ s > 
k. Figures
5(i)-(ii) reveal that Proposition 1 holds in a setting in which private equity ﬁrms base incentive
contracts on the trade sale price.
What about the equilibrium ownership structure determined in stage one? As shown in
Figure 5(iii), by applying the ownership share for the manager on the trade sale price rather
than on the product market proﬁts, private equity ﬁrms can increase their valuation vs for ac-
quiring the target since ~ vs = RA(r
s(~ s)) RNA(r
s(~ s))  (r






s() > r(). WearethenassumingthatRA(r
s()) 
 (r
s();) > RA(r())    (r();), from r
s() > r(), meaning that the net proﬁt of
the acquirer increases from having the manager providing more restructuring. As also shown
27in Figure 5(iii), private equity ﬁrms can even outbid incumbents since ~ vs > vks could hold.
But would incumbents have incentives to copy the compensation contract offered by pri-
vate equity ﬁrms? Yes. Given the same compensation as in equation (35), incumbents would
be able to outbid private equity ﬁrms when giving the manager a contract that mimics a con-







k();)], ~ vks = RA(r
s(~ k))    (r
s(~ k); ~ k)  
RNA(r
s(~ s)) and ~ vks  ~ vs = RA(r
s(~ k))  (r






Thus, as shown in Figure 6, Proposition 2 also holds in a setting in which private equity ﬁrms
give the manager a share of the trade sale price and incumbents can copy this contract.
4.3 Buying to sell and leverage
Debt can also work as an incentive device substituting for (or complementing for) managerial
ownership if debt forces the manager to work harder to avoid bankruptcy (e.g. Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Jensen 1986, 1989). When deciding on leverage, the owners trade off in-
creased restructuring efforts against an increased probability of bankruptcy. As such, we can
link buying to sell to the capital structure of the ﬁrms.
Let us replace managerial ownership with debt in our model to see how this would work.
Formally, at the beginning of stage two, the owner of the target decides how much debt, D, to
acquire and then hires a manager to undertake restructuring to increase r. The probability of
surviving the restructuring stage is (r;D) 2 [0;1], 0
r(r;D) > 0, 00
rr(r;D) < 0, 0
D(r;D) < 0
and00
rD(r;D) > 0. Iftheﬁrmgoesbankruptduringrestructuring(withprobability1 (r;D)),
proﬁts are zero. Debt will not affect product market decisions, since incentive problems are
only present in stage two of the game.
The manager receives a ﬁxed wage b if the ﬁrm survives and zero wage otherwise. The
effort cost of r to the manager is once more C(r) with C0(r) > 0 and C00(r) > 0, but the
manager is no longer risk averse. Formally, given debt D, the manager sets r to maximize







with the associated second-order condition 00
rrb   C00(k) < 0: The manager’s restructuring





An incumbent buying to keep maximizes the expected proﬁt net of interest payments on


























D is the total derivative of debt on the probability of survival (we assume
the second-order condition holds).
A private equity ﬁrm buying to sell maximizes the expected trade sale price net of interest
payments on debt: (r(D))[S3(r(D))   b   iD]. The optimal amount of debt for a private














































Marginal effect on a non-acquirer (positive)
= 0: (42)
A comparison of equation (40) and (42) shows that a private equity backed ﬁrm will take on
more debt than an incumbent owned ﬁrm, i.e. D
s > D
k: The intuition is now familiar. A
private equity ﬁrm maximizes the expected trade sale price, (r(D))[S3(r(D)) b ir(D)]
rather than the expected reduced product market proﬁts, (r(D))[RA(r(D))   b   ir(D)].
If debt is taken on to induce a manager to put more effort into restructuring, then private equity
ﬁrms buying to sell optimally choose higher leverage than incumbents buying to keep.
4.4 IPOs
In our main analysis, a private equity ﬁrm sold the target to an incumbent after restructuring.
There is a small but growing literature on the decision to go public versus being acquired (Brau
et al., 2003; Poulsen and Stegemoller, 2008; Chemmanur and Bayar, 2009). The literature has
so far has mostly concentrated on informational asymmetries. Introducing private equity ﬁrms
to our model, we can show that private equity ﬁrms tend to exit through a trade sale instead of
taking the targets public when IPO costs are high and restructuring costs are not overly convex.
Formally, supposeweallowtheprivateequityﬁrmtoexitthroughanIPO(atIPOcostFIPO)
instead of selling the assets to an incumbent. To simplify, suppose the owners can directly set
r at a cost C(r) and thereby sidestep hiring a manager to undertake restructuring.
If a buyout occurs, we need to determine three valuations: an incumbent’s valuation of
obtaining the target if another incumbent would otherwise have obtained it, the incumbents’
valuations of obtaining the target if it would otherwise have been placed on the market through
an IPO; and the valuation of the private equity ﬁrm undergoing an IPO.
An incumbent’s valuation of obtaining the restructured target if it would otherwise be ob-
tained by another incumbent is
!kk = RA(r;n)   RNA(r;n): (43)
29The incumbent’s preemptive IPO valuation is deﬁned as
!kIPO = RA(r;n)   RNA(r;n + 1); (44)
which is the valuation of acquiring the restructured target if the private equity ﬁrm would oth-
erwise have taken it public (an additional ﬁrm is on the market if an IPO occurs).
Finally, the private equity ﬁrm valuation of taking the ﬁrm public is
!IPO = RE(r;n + 1)   FIPO;
in which the ﬁrst term is simply the product market proﬁts of the target with one more ﬁrm
on the market and the second term is the costs of taking the ﬁrm public. The equilibrium
ownership of the restructured target and the trade sale/IPO price can be described by Table II
(proof available upon request).
Inequality: Deﬁnition: Exit route Trade sale price/IPO revenues
I1 : !IPO > maxf!kIPO;!kkg IPO !
IPO
I2 : !kIPO > !IPO > !kk Trade Sale !
IPO
I3 : !kk > !IPO > !kIPO Trade Sale !
kk
I4 : maxf!kIPO;!kkg > !IPO Trade Sale !
kk
Table II: This table describes the exit route (IPO or trade sale) and the trade sale price/IPO
revenues for any possible ranking of the valuations !.
In I3 and I4, the private equity ﬁrm exits through a trade sale at the trade sale price !
kk. A
high IPO cost, FIPO, ensures that we end up in these regions. So does also a ”not too” convex
restructuring cost function C(r). Both RNA(r;n) and RNA(r;n + 1) are decreasing in r. This
means that !kk(r) and !kIPO(r) increase faster in r than !IPO(r). Then, as we increase r, it is
more likely that inequalities I3 and I4 hold. If C(r) are ”not too” convex, it can be shown that
r
s 2 argmaxr[!kk(r) C(r)] will be larger than rIPO
s 2 argmaxr[RE(r;n+1) C(r) FIPO]
and this means that inequalities I3 and I4 are more likely to hold and that the optimal exit mode
is a trade sale.
4.5 Other selling mechanisms
Let us end this section by relating this result to the literature on endogenous ownership and
efﬁciency. Coase (1960) argued that in a zero-transaction world, laissez-faire always leads to
optimal outcome irrespective of assignment of property rights. We have argued in this paper
that if assets are sold though auctions, and if investment in the assets are possible, the equi-
librium amount of investment will be too high (despite that the assets end up with the most
30efﬁcient owner). This is the case because private equity ﬁrms that buy to sell have an incentive
to overinvest in relation to the eventual owner’s ﬁrst best.
In the analysis, we have assumed that the seller of the target ﬁrm uses a ﬁrst-price sealed
bid auction. We believe this auction set-up accurately approximates bidding competition in
oligopolies. But some possibilities for creating additional rents are neglected as a result. More
generally, Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1999) show that sophisticated mechanisms are
needed to maximize revenues in auctions with externalities; it could be that all ﬁrms in the
market need to provide transfers to the seller. However, as pointed out by Jehiel and Moldovanu
(2000), the seller needs an unrealistically strong commitment power making such mechanisms
impractical. One feasible way for the target ﬁrm to extract more rents is to threaten to commit
to sell to a private equity ﬁrm that will aggressively restructure the assets. An incumbent ﬁrm
would be willing to pay vks,which would give the target ﬁrm larger proceeds compared to when
it sells to a private equity ﬁrm (since S1 = vs < vks).
One way of achieving this would be to state a reservation price of vks, but this will not work
unless the target can restructure its own assets. The reason is that if the reservation price is
vks > vs, private equity ﬁrms will not participate in the auction and the threat of selling to one
of them will not be credible. The maximum willingness to pay for incumbents would then be
vkk and the target ﬁrm would be forced to charge a reservation price lower than vks.
5 Empirical implications
Let us now collect a set of empirical implications and relate them to available empirical evi-
dence.
First, Proposition 1 states that managers in private equity backed ﬁrms will be given more
high powered incentive contracts than managers in incumbent owned ﬁrms, i.e. 
s > 
k.
Consequently, managers in private equity backed ﬁrms in oligopolistic industries have stronger
incentive contracts than managers in incumbent ﬁrms. This prediction is consistent with exist-
ing evidence, although existing evidence does not separate between more and less oligopolistic
industries. For example, Kaplan (1989a); Jensen and Murphy (1990); Kaplan and Str¨ omberg
(2009); Leslie and Oyer (2008) and Acharya and Kehoe (2008) ﬁnd that targets owned by pri-
vate equity ﬁrms have managers with stronger incentive contracts and a larger ownership share
in the ﬁrm.
Second, Proposition 1 also states that more restructuring is undertaken in private equity
backed ﬁrms than in incumbent ﬁrms (r (
s) > r(
k)) leading to higher product market prof-
its (RA(
s) > RA(
k)) and higher productivity. Hence we can state that private equity backed
ﬁrms in oligopolistic industries undertake more restructuring than incumbents, which results in
higher product market proﬁts and higher productivity. This prediction is also consistent with
existing evidence on buyouts in general (but again, evidence does not separate between more
and less oligopolistic industries). For example, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990); Amess (2002,
312003) and Harris et al. (2005) ﬁnd evidence that buyouts increase the productivity of targets.
Third, our model shows that private equity backed ﬁrms will restructure assets beyond
the level that would maximize an incumbent’s proﬁts. This higher level of investment ex-
plains that targets restructured by private equity ﬁrms have better long-run operational per-
formance than incumbents. However, the net proﬁt of the acquirer (including the acquisition
price) will be lower in industries in which private equity is present compared to industries with
no private equity ﬁrms, since the acquisition price of the target will be higher. Proposition 1
states that more restructuring is undertaken in private equity backed ﬁrms than in incumbent
ﬁrms (r (
s) > r(
k)). This means that product market proﬁts are lower for non-acquirers:
RNA(
s) < RNA(
k). Hence we can state that in oligopolistic industries with heavy involve-
ment of private equity ﬁrms should be less proﬁtable than industries with less private equity
involvement.
Fourth, in section 4.3, we derived a prediction for leverage by replacing managerial own-
ership with debt as a way of inducing managerial effort (Jensen 1986, 1989). Thus we can
directly state that private equity backed ﬁrms in oligopolistic industries will be more leveraged.
Evidence is found in, for example, Axelson et al. (2009) and Leslie and Oyer (2008). Axelson
et al. (2009) report that there is no evidence of correlation in debt levels between private equity
owned ﬁrms and similar ﬁrms that are not private equity owned. Our model predicts a corre-
lation, although no correlation is consistent with our model if the optimal amount of debt for
private equity ﬁrms is larger than the maximum amount banks are willing to lend. Then, private
equity ﬁrms will borrow all they can until they hit the constraint set by the banks, and there will
appear to be no correlation between debt levels of incumbents and private equity backed ﬁrms.
Fifth, in section 4.4, we derived predictions on the mode of exit. In particular, we can state
that for private equity backed ﬁrms in oligopolistic industries, the optimal exit mode is a trade
sale if IPO costs are high, or if restructuring costs are not too convex. Moreover, the trade sale
price is more sensitive to restructuring than the IPO valuation which has implications for the
characteristics of targets that will be exited through a trade sale. Firms that exited through a
trade sale should be more restructured and should therefore have higher product market proﬁts
and productivity. To our knowledge, no systematic econometric work has been done on how
the exit mode for private equity depends on IPO costs, on restructuring costs, and on cost and
demand shocks. However, Lerner (1994) and Brau et al. (2003) ﬁnd that market timing affects
the mode of exit for venture capital exits.
6 Concluding remarks
We have studied private equity ﬁrms that buy to sell in oligopolistic markets, showing that
buying to sell gives incentives to overinvest in restructuring. This leads to higher leverage
and larger managerial ownership in target ﬁrms, two hallmarks of the private equity business
model. Our key insight is that buying to sell makes private equity ﬁrms more aggressive in
32restructuring, sincetheequilibriumtradesalepriceincreasesinrestructuringnotonlybyraising
the product market proﬁts of the acquirer, but also by decreasing the product market proﬁts of
non-acquiring ﬁrms. To be valid, our mechanism essentially only requires that there is a focus
on buying to sell, a trade sale exit is considered, and that at least two ﬁrms from the same
industry bid for the private equity backed target in the exit auction.
As such, we argue that private equity ﬁrms ﬁll an important role as challengers of existing
oligopoliesthroughaggressiverestructuringofassetsupforsale. Thewelfareeffectsofbuyouts
are ambiguous, but consumers always gain from a buyout as opposed to an acquisition by an
incumbent ﬁrm. By being outsiders without assets in the market, private equity ﬁrms have
stronger incentives than incumbents to invest in acquiring restructuring skills. These skills–
potentially in combination with tax advantages, easy access to capital, and coordination failures
among incumbents–subsequently allow them to outbid incumbents wanting to preemptively
acquire the assets to prevent overinvestment in restructuring.
We believe there are other market situations apart from product market effects in which
owners buying to sell have fundamentally different incentives than owners buying to keep. To
see this, suppose an owner (who is buying to keep or buying to sell) undertakes an investment,
, in an asset. Both owner types face the same investment costs c(). The investment leads
to a discounted stream of proﬁts for the eventual owner of the asset. It then follows that as
long as the marginal effect on the sale price, S0(), equals the marginal effect on the long-run
value, V 0(), the owner buying to sell and the owner buying to keep will undertake the same
investment (s = k). But as shown in the analysis above , if there are oligopolistic externalities
on the trade sale price it holds that S0() > V 0() and the owner buying to sell will invest more
(s > k).
Other market situations could cause buy to sell owners to have different investment incen-
tives than buy to keep owners. For example, appropriability problems in connection with the
saleaffectinvestmentinpatents. Anownerbuyingtokeeppreferstokeepmostofherimportant
innovations as trade secrets, whereas an owner buying to sell must patent them to keep poten-
tial buyers from stealing the secrets. Reputation is also important. Owners buying to sell often
have to repeatedly raise funds from outside investors for their investments. For these investors,
the exit sends a signal about the quality of the owner. A good signal makes it easier to raise the
next fund, implying that owners buying to sell have additional incentives to perform well. This
affects the sale price S(), but not the long-run value V (). Examining these different issues
related to buying assets with the intent of selling them is an exciting avenue for future research.
33A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the equilibrium candidate b = (b
1;b
2;:::;b
n). Incumbent f is the incumbent that
has posted the highest bid and obtains the restructured target and ﬁrm s is the incumbent with
the second highest bid. Then, b
f  !kk is a weakly dominated strategy. b
f < !kk   " is
not an equilibrium, since ﬁrm i 6= f then beneﬁts from deviating to bi = b
f + "; since it will
then obtain the restructured target and pay a price lower than its valuation of obtaining it. If
b
f = !kk  ", and b
s 2 [!kk  ";S  2"], then no incumbent has an incentive to deviate, b is a
Nash equilibrium and the winning bid is b
f = !kk   ":
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
First, bi  maxfvs;vkk;vksg is a weakly dominated strategy. No owner wants to post a bid
above its valuation of obtaining the assets and the assets will always be sold.
Inequality I1 (vkk > vks > vs): Since vks > vs; a buy-to-keep owner will always have an
incentive to outbid buy-to-sell owners. The buy-to-keep owners will then bid up the price to
vkk to prevent a rival from obtaining the assets. A buy-to-keep owner will obtain the assets.
Inequality I2 (vkk > vs > vks): Since vs > vks, the outcome depends on what a buy-to-keep
owner believes will happen if it does not win. If it believes that another buy-to-keep owner will
win, buy-to-keep owners will then bid up the price to vkk and a buy-to-keep owner will obtain
the assets. If it believes that a buy-to-sell owner will win, then since vs > vks the buy-to-sell
owners will bid up the price to vs and a buy-to-keep owner will obtain the assets.
Inequality I3 (vks > vkk > vs): Since vks > vs; a buy-to-keep owner will always have an
incentive to outbid buy-to-sell owners. The buy-to-keep owners will then bid up the price to vkk
to prevent a rival from obtaining the assets. A buy-to-keep owner will obtain the assets. Since
buy-to-keep owners realize that a buy-to-sell owner will never obtain the assets (vks > vs), the
price will not be bid up to vks.
Inequality I4 (vks > vs > vkk): Since vks > vs; a buy-to-keep owner will always have an
incentive to outbid buy-to-sell owners and bid up the price to slightly above vs. However, only
one buy-to-keep owner has this incentive, since no other buy-to-keep owner wants to outbid
him or her (vs > vkk). A buy-to-keep owner will then obtain the assets at price vs.
Inequality I5 (vs > vkk > vks): Since vs > vks, no buy-to-keep owners will want to outbid
the buy-to-sell owners. The buy-to-sell owners will then bid up the price to vs and a buy-to-sell
owner will obtain the assets.
Inequality I6 (vs > vks > vkk): Since vs > vks, no buy-to-keep owners will want to outbid
the buy-to-sell owners. The buy-to-sell owners will then bid up the price to vs and a buy-to-sell
owner will obtain the assets.




k(r) and 0 < f00
s (r) < f00
k(r), then this advantage will lead to private equity ﬁrms
providing more high powered incentive contracts ^ s > ^ k, which leads to more aggressive
restructuring r
s(^ s) > r
k(^ k): First, the compensation contract given to the manager is now
wh(b;) = b + [RA(r)   F + "   fh(r)] h = s;k (45)
and that the optimal restructuring intensity r











h()) h = s;k: (46)
Given the same contract , a manager in a private equity backed ﬁrm with lower restructuring

























This holds since f00
s < f00
k. Next, we need to ﬁgure out the optimal share to give to the manager.
An incumbent will maximize expected proﬁts E[RA(r
k()) F +" fk(r
k())  e wk(b;)]
by optimally choosing the contract fb;g. Assuming perfect competition between managers,
the optimal contract must fulﬁll the participation constraint wk(b;)   C(r
k())   
() =  w,
in which  w is the outside option for the managers. Solving e wk(b;) =  w + C(r
k()) + 
()
from the participation constraint, and using E["] = 0, the expected proﬁt can be written as
E[RA(r

k())   F + "   fk(r






in which  k() = F + fk(r
k()) +  w + C(r
k()) + 
() is the total costs for inducing
restructuring, i.e. the sum of the expected restructuring costs and the compensation paid to the
manager.
































35Making use of the total cost  h() = F +fh(r
h())+  w+C(r
h())+
(), we can rewrite










h()) = (1   )
dRA
dr
h = s;k: (51)
Since  h() = F + fh(r
h()) +  w + C(r
h()) + 




















0() h = s;k: (52)































































































































Hence, the manager’s ﬁrst-order condition in equation (47), (49) and (50) can be re-written
as:






























d > 0 from equation(47), equation (59) reveals that
privateequityﬁrmsgivestrongerincentivecontractstotheirmanagers, ^ s > ^ k. Fromequation
(47), private equity ﬁrms must then induce more restructuring (r
s(^ s) > r
k(^ k)).
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